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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
From the perspective of today’s cultural zeitgeist, police officers are either noble keepers of 
civilization or wicked manipulators of justice. Officers either chivalrously lay down their lives to 
protect the public, or corruptibly oppress the downtrodden. As with many things, however, the 
truth lies somewhere between these two extremes, and generally varies along this spectrum on a 
case-by-case basis. Unfortunately, the criminal justice system operates on this extreme binary 
system of police credibility: officers are either honorable or, if thoroughly convinced, horrible.   
 
Justice Warren Burger succinctly summarized the judiciary’s long-standing view of officer 
testimony1 half a century ago. 
 
[I]t would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its 
security are called to testify in court under oath, their testimony must be viewed 
with suspicion. This would be tantamount to saying that police officers are 
inherently untrustworthy. The cure for unreliable police officers is not to be found 
in such a shotgun approach.2  
 
According to the judiciary, then, officers are presumed gallant. At the same time, juries are 
currently instructed to treat police officer testimony as though it came from any other witness.3 
This method presumably attempts to assuage jurors who may view police testimony as 
irreproachable. Instead, such an approach sweeps many problems associated with police 
testimony under the proverbial rug.4 It seems imbalanced for courts to acknowledge police as the 
“guardians of its security,” a view shared by many in the public, but only offer a few sentences 
within jury instructions ordering jurors to treat officers as any other witness. In the face of the 
strong favorable bias currently attached to police testimony by certain juror demographics, such 
a blasé attempt to convince a jury to treat these judicially proclaimed heroes as merely any other 
witnesses is not an effective solution.  
 
Viewing police testimony from the courts’ binary perspective obfuscates the real problem. 
Instead of painting the issue as one concerned with the inherent trustworthiness of officers, this 
article suggests recommendations that seek to make the criminal justice system fairer in its 
outcomes. The main recommendation of this article is to introduce cautionary jury instructions in 
certain cases where police officers testify, while a secondary recommendation concerns using 
specific voir dire questions to obtain a fairer jury. These recommendations would simply be 
continuing the trend of bettering the justice system, both through police practices and courtroom 
procedures, by giving juries awareness of the true role and power that officers have in the 
criminal courts.  
 
                                                 
1 Justice Warren Burger wrote this opinion before he became the Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
2 Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  
3 Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses 
with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 256 (2017).  
4 Id. 
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In Part II, this article outlines the problem of unearned, implicit credibility given to police officer 
testimony by juries, as well as the reasons behind this problem’s existence. Part III examines the 
negative effects of this issue on the criminal justice system, including police officer conduct and 
the various consequences of wrongful convictions. Part IV offers recommendations to address 
this problem, such as cautionary jury instructions and voir dire questions to identify jurors most 
likely to take police testimony at face value. Finally, Part V provides a conclusion to this article. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM: JURORS OFTEN GIVE OFFICER TESTIMONY IMPLICIT CREDIBILITY FOR NO 
GOOD REASON 
 
A. Why Officers Gain Credibility from Juries by Merely Being Officers 
 
Police officers inhabit a unique role in society. As noted by former Chief Justice Burger, officers 
act as the protectors of society, and in that role interact with members of the public who vary in 
economic, racial, and social status. The perception of police tends to vary drastically among 
these different demographics, and is especially pronounced among different racial groups.5 
Specifically, white, upper-middle class Americans are about twice as likely to have a positive 
view of police as African-Americans.6 While the reasons for these different perceptions are 
numerous, one disproportionate cause is both the real and perceived discrimination against 
minorities within the criminal justice system.   
 
Discrimination against minorities in the criminal justice system has been well documented.7 One 
particularly noteworthy example is the fact that African-Americans are imprisoned at over five 
times the rate of white Americans in state prisons, despite making up a much smaller portion of 
the overall population.8 While this statistic alone may not be dispositive proof of discrimination, 
it should at least raise eyebrows.  
 
Another curious issue generally not discussed in the public sphere is that cities in need of 
revenue often end up ticketing minority populations disproportionately to white populations.9 
                                                 
5 Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the 
Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 540 (2008) (discussing white, black, and Hispanic views on police 
satisfaction by demographic).  
6 Rich Morin et al., The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 
29, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/09/29/the-racial-confidence-gap-in-police-performance/. 
7 Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins-Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias 
and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV.712–16 (2015) (examining certain implicit 
biases which create a broad variance in the way racial groups are treated at various phases in the criminal 
system); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, 
Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); see German Lopez, American policing is 
broken. Here’s how to fix it, VOX (May 2, 2017, 9:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2016/11/29/12989428/police-shooting-race-crime/. 
8 Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in State Prisons, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT (June 2016) at 3, http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-
Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf.  
9 German Lopez, Study: cities rely more on fines for revenue if they have more black residents, VOX (July 
7, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/7/7/15929196/police-fines-study-racism.  
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Interestingly, these citations fell on average by about fifty percent after the election of one black 
person onto city council.10  
 
Yet another disconcerting issue with racial implications is the differential punishment associated 
with crack cocaine versus powdered cocaine, despite the fact both drugs are nearly identical in 
their chemical makeup.11 Individuals who use crack cocaine have a higher likelihood of being 
black, low-income, and less educated than those who use powdered cocaine.12 For example, in 
2015, 87% of prisoners convicted in federal court of crack offenses were black,13 while the racial 
statistics of powdered cocaine offenses were far less skewed.14 Those charged with possessing 
one gram of crack cocaine generally face the same sentence as those found with 18 grams of 
powdered cocaine.15 While one would expect such unfairness to have simply been overlooked or 
unexamined, this wide sentencing disparity exists after already having undergone reform.16 The 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 lowered the sentencing gap between crack and powdered cocaine 
from 100:1 to the current 18:1 ratio.17 In other words, before 2010, those who possessed one 
gram of crack generally received a similar sentence to those in possession of 100 grams of 
powdered cocaine.18 Such a contrast at least gives the appearance of unfairly targeting black, 
low-income, and less educated individuals.19 
 
                                                 
10 Id. Similarly, in schools, one study has shown African-American children receive harsher punishments 
than white students, which likely does nothing to allay perceptions of unfairness attributed to authority 
figures later in life. See Russell J. Skiba, Suzanne E. Eckes, & Kevin Brown, African American 
Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071, 1088 (2010) (citing Anne C. McFadden & George E. 
Marsh, A Study of Race and GenderBias in the Punishment of School Children, 15 EDUC. & 
TREATMENT CHILD 140, 140–47 (1992)). 
11 Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack Vs. Coke Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV (Feb. 22, 
2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (citing Joseph J. 
Palamar et al., Powder cocaine and crack use in the United States: An examination of risk for arrest and 
socioeconomic disparities in use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015)). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Danielle Kurtzleben, Data Shows Racial Disparity in Crack Sentencing, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 3, 2010, 
2:45 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/08/03/data-show-racial-disparity-in-crack-
sentencing.  
15 Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack Vs. Coke Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV (Feb. 22, 
2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (citing Joseph J. 
Palamar et al., Powder cocaine and crack use in the United States: An examination of risk for arrest and 
socioeconomic disparities in use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015)). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Likewise, at least one study has shown that officers are consistently more likely to use greater force on 
minority suspects than with white suspects. See also Cristal Harris, Dark Innocence: Retraining Police 
with Mindfulness Practices to Aid in Squelching Implicit Bias, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 112 (2017) (citing 
Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 
92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007)). 
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Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue of race when selecting jurors due 
to the prevalence of discrimination by prosecutors nationwide. Over 40 years ago, the Supreme 
Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to deny someone the opportunity to serve on a jury based 
on their race.20 Although the Supreme Court recognized a significant problem with jury 
selections, and its ruling likely had some positive effect, the ruling is still criticized for allowing 
prosecutors to mask their peremptory challenges in neutral language, which has the effect of 
removing minority jurors.21  
 
While issues of racial discrimination are a problem all their own, these issues are often 
compounded because of the lack of jury diversity.22 Many times, the jury pool looks much 
different than the defendant, as juries across America tend to be white and upper-middle class.23 
Instead of being tried by a jury of one’s peers, a defendant usually finds himself facing “peers” 
with a higher economic class, lighter skin tone, different social background, and inability to truly 
empathize with the defendant’s circumstances.24 This problem is pronounced with race, 
especially in regard to African-Americans.25 For example, one study found all-white juries 
convict black defendants 16% more often than white defendants.26 However, when at least one 
African-American was included in the jury pool, the racial conviction gap fell to nearly even.27         
 
Moreover, individuals with a more positive perception of police have a higher probability of 
obeying officer commands, engaging in crime stopping activities, and, critically, supporting 
prosecution theories of evidence.28 Studies have shown broadly that white jurors are more 
                                                 
20 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).  
21 See also Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory 
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 503 (1996) (defining the legacy of Batson as a failure and 
seeking the abolishment of peremptory challenges); Parker Kelly, Racial Discrimination in Jury 
Selection: The Failure of Batson Challenges and Potential Solutions, GW JUSTICE J. (Nov. 19, 2016), 
https://www.gwjusticejournal.com/single-post/2016/11/19/Racial-Discrimination-in-Jury-Selection-The-
Failure-of-Batson-Challenges-and-Potential-Solutions (explaining prosecutors hide racial challenges with 
neutral reasons for removing minority jurors).  
22 Ashish S. Joshi & Christine T. Cline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual 
Consequences, AMERICAN BAR (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees 
/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-consequences.html 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Vivian Ho, For SF’s black defendants, it’s hard to find jury of peers, SF CHRONICLE (March 4, 2017), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/For-SF-s-black-defendants-it-s-hard-to-find-10977625.php. 
26 Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16% More Often than Whites, 
(April 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy.  
27 Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, Q.  J. ECONOMICS (2011) at 3, 
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1349&context=heinzworks.   
28 Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, & Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal 
Authorities and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 773, 793 (2013).  
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accepting of the prosecution’s theories of evidence, while African-American jurors are more 
suspicious, especially concerning police testimony.29  
 
Therefore, the lack of jury diversity has two troublesome components. Not only are the white, 
upper-middle class individuals that generally serve on juries implicitly unable or unwilling to 
identify with certain defendants, but these same jurors, who generally view police favorably, are 
more willing to sympathize with the prosecution and police testimony. When faced with these 
facts, the purported gap in convictions based on race suddenly becomes more understandable.30     
 
Distortions of the judicial system are not limited to race, as many people exhibit both implicit 
and explicit biases in favor of authority figures.31 Authority and the effects of obedience have 
been long studied,32 and a link exists between authority-biased jurors and defendant 
convictions.33 The company of such jurors in a jury pool leads to a higher conviction rate, even 
when evidence is slanted toward the defendant.34 The presence of authoritarian jurors appear 
even more problematic when viewed with the ancillary problem of implicit police credibility, as 
such jurors may have a broader impact on convictions than previously realized, especially if 
many other jurors already implicitly favor the prosecution.  
 
Unfortunately, the need for juries to scrutinize officers on the stand is not simply theoretical, as 
implicit credibility towards police testimony can lead to a host of untoward consequences within 
the criminal system.  
 
III. THE EFFECTS: NOT GREAT FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
 
A. Unsubstantiated Officer Credibility Leads to Less Scrutiny of Police Conduct and Opens the 
Door for Injustice 
 
As previously discussed, the current composition of juries tends to be more favorable to the 
prosecution and police. One manifestation of this bias is through increased credibility of police 
                                                 
29 Id. at 777; Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police 
Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017). 
30 Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16% More Often than Whites, 
(April 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy. 
31 See also Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of Authoritarianism as an 
Indicator of Juror Bias, THE JURY EXPERT (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-
me-to-your-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. 
Narby, Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and 
jurors' perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)); cf. Stanley 
Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) (examining the limits 
and pressures of obedience on behavior). 
32 Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 371-78 (1963) 
(examining the limits and pressures of obedience on behavior). 
33 See also Douglas J. Narby, Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between 
authoritarianism and jurors' perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 
(1993)). 
34 Id. 
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testimony. Such unearned officer credibility creates an atmosphere of reduced scrutiny, as jurors 
are more willing to take an officer at her word without the necessary analysis, reasoning, and 
ultimate weighing of credibility. Less police scrutiny leads to problems for the judicial system, 
especially because police officers, like anyone, are not perfect.  
 
First of all, it is hard to be a cop. The average life span of a male law enforcement officer is 
nearly 22 years shorter than men in the general public.35 Officers generally carry higher levels of 
stress than the average citizen, which is linked to a bevy of negative health effects.36 These 
effects include a higher prevalence of sleep disorders, diabetes, heart disease, brain cancer, 
Hodgkin’s lymphoma and suicide.37 Moreover, the stress and pressure of the job has an impact 
on brain chemistry, as officers’ brains show a connection between trauma and a reduction in 
decision-making, memory, and stress regulation.38 Compounding these issues is the fact that 7%-
19% of active-duty police officers likely suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.39 Perhaps 
as a direct consequence of these factors, officers are more likely to die from suicide than in the 
line of duty.40 Operating under these pressures and difficulties, police sometimes make good-
faith mistakes both during an investigation and on the stand.41 Such mistakes can be expected but 
should be appropriately litigated and scrutinized in court by a jury cognizant of these issues.  
 
Similarly, police officers are not necessarily in a position to be impartial, and juries are not told 
of this fact. Officers work closely with prosecutors, and spend every day dealing with crime and 
                                                 
35 Stephen M. Soltys, MD, Officer Wellness: A Focus on Mental Health, 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 439 (2016). 
36 Ellen Goldbaum, Police Officer Stress Creates Significant Health Risks Compared to General 
Population, Study Finds, UB NEWS CENTER (July 9, 2012), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/ 
2012/07/13532.html (citing M.E. Andrew et al., The Buffalo Cardio-Metabolic Occupational Police 
Stress (BCOPS) pilot study: methods and participant characteristics, PUBMED (Sept. 12, 2005), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16165369). 
37 Id.  
38 Erika Hayasaki, Life of a Police Officer: Medically and Psychologically Ruinous, THE ATLANTIC 
(March 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/life-of-a-police-officer-medically-
and-psychologically-ruinous/284324/ (citing C. Chung et al., Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder 
and exposure to traumatic stressors are related to brain structural volumes and behavioral measures of 
affective stimulus processing in police officers, PUBMED (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pubmed/23177923). 
39 Charles R. Marmar, et al., Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress in Police and Other First Responders, 
1071 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 18 (2006), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/ 
74485/annals.1364.00?sequence=1. 
40 Stephen M. Soltys, MD, Officer Wellness: A Focus on Mental Health, 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 439 (2016). 
(citing Pamela Kulbarsh, 2015 Police Suicide Statistics, OFFICER (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.of 
ficer.com/article/12156622/2015-police-suicide-statistics). 
41 Daniel N. Haas, Must Officers Be Perfect?: Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of Fact during Traffic Stops, 
62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035 (2013); Traci Pedersen, Study Finds Racial Disparities in Traffic Stops, 
PSYCHCENTRAL, https://psychcentral.com/news/2016/07/02/study-finds-racial-disparities-in-traffic-
stops/106086.html; Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the 
Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002) 
7
Warren: Hidden in Plain View
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2018
8 
WARREN: HIDDEN IN PLAIN VIEW 
 
criminals.42 This sort of exposure has the potential to affect their outlook and perspective.43 Due 
to this viewpoint, some officers may hold implicit biases against individuals who are identified 
as suspects. Even the Supreme Court has opined on this subject and long recognized that officers 
engage in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,” which may affect the ability 
to be impartial.44 Just as with good-faith mistakes made by officers, juries should be made fully 
aware of police relationships with the prosecution and the potential for biases this engenders.  
 
Additionally, unlike other witnesses who may testify only once in a lifetime, police officers are 
“expert” fact witnesses.45 Officers consistently understand more about courtroom procedure, 
reasonable doubt, and the elements of a crime than lay witnesses, and they know how to 
manipulate the system to their advantage if they choose to do so.46  
 
Unfortunately, some officers intentionally behave unlawfully. These officers engage in illegal 
activities across a broad spectrum.47 Such individuals actively and measurably diminish the 
credibility of the judicial system with each indiscretion. While Justice Burger was not in favor of 
a “shotgun approach” for cautionary jury instructions with police testimony, officers who act 
illegally should not be allowed to continue unnoticed and unhindered merely because of their 
status in the criminal system.  
 
Compounding these issues is a lack of appropriate punishment for officers who engage in 
unlawful behavior, especially when considering the unique role and power police have within the 
judicial system.48 While a lack of disciplinary action can be attributed to a number of factors –– 
                                                 
42 Howard Friedman, To Protect and Serve?, TRIAL, Dec. 7, 2011, at 14, 16 (citing David Harris, The 
Interaction and Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How this Affects 
Police Reform Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna and 
Marianne Wade eds., 2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this 
relationship impacts police misconduct). 
43 See also Cristal Harris, Dark Innocence: Retraining Police with Mindfulness Practices to Aid in 
Squelching Implicit Bias, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 112 (2017) (citing Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin 
Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007) (discussing that officers are consistently more likely to use greater force with 
minority suspects than with white suspects)). 
44 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
45 Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1322 (1994) (“The problem is that some 
officers have learned to describe investigations that conform to constitutional requirements - regardless of 
the reality of the investigation.”). 
46 Id. 
47 Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer 
Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 253 (2017); Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for 
Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010); Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause: A Case for 
Judging Police by A More Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 268 (2010) (finding police 
perjury commonplace, beginning with a study in 1968 after Mapp). 
48 Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" As Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A 
New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998); David Harris, The Interaction and 
Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How This Affects Police Reform 
8
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including the strength of police unions, the reflexive instinct for police to protect other officers 
from perceived attacks, and officers’ close relationships with prosecutors –– the buck ultimately 
stops with the courts’ overall reluctance to address the issue.49 Courts have been unwilling to 
adequately deter police misconduct, and have generally avoided the perception of categorizing 
police “as accomplices, drug addicts, or perjurers when it comes to weighing credibility,” even 
when it appears warranted.50 Moreover, officers know the risk of severe punishment is minimal 
and that, even if caught, they would likely receive only “a court reprimand or, at most, a fairly 
short jail sentence.”51 Coupled with less scrutiny, some officers can more easily manipulate the 
outcome of a case, while other officers may feel less risk associated with committing illegal acts. 
An officer’s unlawful behavior may lead to severe consequences, if not for the individual officer, 
then at least for the criminal justice system as a whole. 
 
B. Less Police Scrutiny Leads to a Higher Wrongful Conviction Rate (And the Problems that 
Accompany It) 
 
Less scrutiny of police officer testimony can lead to a higher wrongful conviction rate52 and all 
of the problems (both direct and collateral) that accompany such convictions.53 For one, an 
atmosphere of unchecked police support in the courtroom allows otherwise discernable double-
counting problems to escape detection and multiply. Evidentiary double counting occurs when 
one independent and one dependent piece of evidence are incorrectly viewed as two independent 
                                                                                                                                                             
Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, eds, 
2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this relationship impacts 
police misconduct); Connor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the 
Street, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-
unions-keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/; Waseem Abbasi, Convictions are rare for officers in 
police shootings, USA TODAY (June 17, 2017, 7:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation 
/2017/06/17/convictions-rare-officers-police-shootings/102947548/. 
49 Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" As Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A 
New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998); David Harris, The Interaction and 
Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How This Affects Police Reform 
Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, eds, 
2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this relationship impacts 
police misconduct); Connor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the 
Street, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-
unions-keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/; Waseem Abbasi, Convictions are rare for officers in 
police shootings, USA TODAY (June 17, 2017, 7:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation 
/2017/06/17/convictions-rare-officers-police-shootings/102947548/. 
50 Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" As Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A 
New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 264 (1998) 
51 Id. at 272.  
52 Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 
(2013) (explaining how officer misconduct causes wrongful convictions). 
53 Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. 
OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-consequences.aspx.   
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pieces.54 An example of this issue would be an eyewitness identification combined with a 
dubious confession gained through subsequent officer interrogation. On its face it would appear 
the defendant had been identified and confessed; however, with a reasonable dose of scrutiny, 
one hopes the veracity of the confession would be examined in the courtroom by a jury aware of 
the potential issues.  
 
Moreover, once these wrongful convictions come to light, the criminal justice system loses 
important credibility with the public.55 After a prolonged degradation of the courts’ credibility, it 
is to be assumed that some people would start to question the usefulness of an unfair system of 
justice. The reality or perception of allowing the judicial system to impose harsher penalties for 
the same conduct based on a protected class (such as race) is unsustainable and continues to 
whittle away at the courts’ credibility in the public sphere.56  
 
Finally, wrongful convictions (like any conviction) carry a host of collateral consequences.57 
Wrongful convictions can unjustifiably take years away from an innocent individual, isolate 
them from family and friends, and lead to the inability to support themselves.58 Any convicted 
person will face employment issues, as those with a criminal record will likely find employers 
less willing to “risk” hiring a convict.59 Similarly, convicts can expect to face housing problems, 
as certain areas will not rent to convicted individuals.60  Even the children of convicts are 
impacted, as they face higher rates of recidivism and incarceration, which leads to cyclical issues 
for their family.61  
 
Taken together, these circumstances lay bare an unseemly and harmful problem: the current 
composition of juries across the nation tend to favor the prosecution and police testimony, while 
simultaneously disfavoring many defendants, simply because of the unknown (or sometimes, 
known) presence of bias. Regarding police testimony, such unearned favor can lead to a 
multitude of detrimental effects for the justice system. For these reasons, the current system 
requires change.  
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: VOIR DIRE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS 
                                                 
54 Cf. Robert P. Mosteller, Pernicious Inferences: Double Counting and Perception and Evaluation 
Biases in Criminal Cases, 58 HOW. L.J. 365, 380–83 (2015). 
55 Cf. Matt Ford, Guilty, Then Proven Innocent, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic 
.com/politics/archive/2015/02/guilty-then-proven-innocent/385313/ (exposing flaws within the current 
judicial system).  
56 See Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of 
Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413, 415 (1997); Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack vs. Coke 
Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV (Feb. 22, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.vo 
cativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (discussing the racial implications of inconsistent 
sentencing with crack and powdered cocaine). 
57 Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. 
OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-consequences.aspx.   
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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A. The Judiciary’s Current Solution Is Inadequate 
 
One case highlighting the criminal justice system’s current treatment of police is State v. 
Williams.62 In Williams, the defendant was charged with murder and, as part of his defense, 
sought cautionary jury instruction that examined the credibility of law enforcement officers.63 
Defendant suggested the following jury instructions be given: 
 
You have heard the testimony of law enforcement officials. The fact that a witness may 
be employed by the federal or state government as a law enforcement official does not 
mean that his testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater 
or lesser weight than that of an ordinary witness. 
At the same time, it is quite legitimate for defense counsel to try to attack the credibility 
of a law enforcement witness on the grounds that his testimony may be colored by a 
personal or professional interest in the outcome of the case. 
It is your decision, after reviewing all the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of 
the law enforcement witness and to give to that testimony whatever weight, if any, you 
find it deserves.64 
 
This instruction does not appear on its face to be unreasonable, as it simply states police may not 
be in a position to be impartial. Nonetheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the 
holding in Bush, stating that cautionary instructions were appropriately given to certain witnesses 
in the underlying trial, which included one individual who received a plea deal and another who 
may have been under a large amount of emotional and physical stress at the time of her 
observation.65 The court went on to state that “[s]pecial instructions concerning potentially 
interested witnesses are proper . . . but they are inappropriate when, as here, there is nothing in 
the record to cast doubt upon the truthfulness and objectivity of the witness.”66 In other words, 
even though the officer was engaged in a profession fraught with the potential for bias towards 
suspected criminals,67 because the record showed no misconduct or untruthfulness in this 
particular case, it was proper for the lower court to refuse to give cautionary jury instructions 
regarding the officer’s testimony.68  
 
By instructing juries to treat police as normal witnesses, the courts’ current solution to officer 
testimony is flawed. Courts presumably are attempting to dispel the notion that officer testimony 
                                                 
62 State v. Williams, 430 S.E.2d 888, 895 (1993). 
63 Id. at 894. 
64 Id. at 895. These instructions appear relatively tame considering the later recommendations of this 
article.  
65 Id. 
66 The court denied a request for special instructions regarding the credibility of police testimony. Id. 
67 See also Cristal Harris, Dark Innocence: Retraining Police with Mindfulness Practices to Aid in 
Squelching Implicit Bias, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 112 (2017) (citing Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin 
Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007)). 
68 It should also be noted the police officer’s testimony in Williams did not appear to be a substantial 
portion of the State’s case against the defendant. Id.  
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is unimpeachable, but, by ignoring a plethora of issues, such an attempt eventually has unwanted 
effects.69 Primarily, the judiciary expects a seemingly offhand instruction –– that officers should 
be treated as any other witness –– to do an inordinate amount of work. As discussed, individuals 
who currently serve as jurors generally have a more favorable view of police and the 
prosecution. This perspective likely tips the scales of justice towards the prosecution. Instead of 
addressing the presence of this advantageous bias and discussing the actual role police inhabit in 
society, the courts simply tell jurors to treat officers as any other witness. These instructions 
ignore the potential for inherent favoritism towards police that the average juror may knowingly 
or unknowingly hold.70 
The recommendations of this article shouldn’t wither and die simply because the argument 
against jury instructions is recast and viewed as an attempt to subvert officer trustworthiness in 
general. Instead, these recommendations should be regarded as additional, relatively small steps 
towards resolving problems within the criminal justice system. Acknowledging the potential for 
implicit bias towards police credibility is merely one small (but significant) step in the right 
direction.  
 
B. Recommendation One: Provide Cautionary Jury Instructions Regarding Police Testimony To 
Lessen The Implicit Bias Of Juries 
 
The judicial system needs to acknowledge, through jury instructions, that many juries today give 
officers an implicit boost in credibility. Such instructions would attempt to move any implicit 
bias to the forefront of a jury’s consciousness, where it could be examined, dissected, and 
ultimately rejected. The wording of these instructions would need to walk a thin tightrope, where 
leaning too far to one side unfairly paints all officers as inherently untrustworthy (as noted by 
Justice Burger), and leaning too far to the other side has no effect on juries at all. 
 
1. Effectiveness of Jury Instructions in Other Areas of the Law 
 
To avoid reinventing the wheel, one should examine the outcomes of cautionary jury instructions 
given in other contexts of the law in crafting useful and convincing jury instruction language 
regarding the credibility of officer testimony. Even if certain language for jury instructions 
regarding officer testimony is unanimously deemed adequate by judges throughout the nation, 
                                                 
69 Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer 
Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017); Michelle Alexander, Why Police Lie Under Oath, 
NY TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-police-officers-lie-
under-oath.html.  
70 See also State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 251, 49 A.3d 705, 731 (2012) (“[T]he reliability of 
eyewitness identifications frequently is not a matter within the knowledge of an average juror.”). 
Similarly, the average juror (who is generally white, upper-middle class, and holds a more favorable view 
of police) cannot be expected to sufficiently identify and grapple with the unconscious favor given to 
police from the current form of jury instructions. Just as with other areas of the law, certain jurors may 
need to hear all of the facts to convince them that every officer does not fit the stereotypical mold of 
friendly, helpful, and impartial. 
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such language must successfully influence juries in order to be effective. Unfortunately, the 
judicial system appears to still be searching for such effectiveness.71 In general:  
 
Studies are mixed as to whether instructions actually improve jurors' understanding. 
Overall, research shows that jurors' comprehension of instructions is rather poor. Some 
studies show modest improvement in juror understanding about procedural rules or 
definitions of crimes, for example, while other studies show that instructed jurors are no 
more knowledgeable than non-instructed jurors.72 
 
While other areas of the law have given specific cautionary jury instructions,73 the effects of 
these exact instructions have not been thoroughly studied. One area worth discussing, however, 
are the different types of jury instructions given in eyewitness identification cases, as well as the 
effect of such instructions. 
 
2. Eyewitness Identifications: Effectiveness of Jury Instructions 
 
This section examines three separate cases that have delved into the guidelines behind cautionary 
jury instructions for eyewitness identifications. Each case, while similar, took a somewhat 
different route to accomplish this task. This article takes an analogous approach by offering three 
different versions of potential jury instructions regarding police credibility, and bases these 
versions in part on the approaches discussed in the eyewitness identification cases within this 
section.  
 
In recent years, a litany of research has shown serious issues with eyewitness identifications, as 
evidenced by the fact that 71% of wrongful convictions examined by the Innocence Project have 
involved these types of identifications.74 In fact, misidentifications are one the largest contributor 
to wrongful convictions in the United States.75 Due to the unreliability of these identifications 
and the large role they play in the criminal justice system, courts across the nation have 
attempted to address misidentifications through jury instructions.   
 
Just as cautionary jury instructions with officer testimony would need to walk a tightrope to be 
effective, so too must jury instructions for eyewitness testimony. “To be effective, safeguards 
                                                 
71 Laura Whitney Lee, Silencing the "Twittering Juror": The Need to Modernize Pattern Cautionary Jury 
Instructions to Reflect the Realities of the Electronic Age, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 181 (2010) (examining 
the effects of and ease of access to the internet on juries). 
72 Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be 
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC 
L. REV. 865, 923–24 (2015).  
73 These areas include instructions involving testimony from defendants (although many courts merely 
instruct juries to treat this testimony as if it were from any other witness), accomplices (especially when 
uncorroborated), and informants. Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the 
Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 260-261 (2017). 
74 THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, DNA Exonerations in the United States, https://www.innocenceproject.or 
g/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/.   
75 THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, Eyewitness Misidentification, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/ 
eyewitness-misidentification/. 
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should maximize juror sensitivity to factors that influence the accuracy of an identification (i.e., 
the ability to discriminate between good and bad witnessing and identification conditions) 
without inducing a general sense of skepticism regarding the ability of all eyewitnesses to make 
correct identifications.”76  
 
Courts have looked to scientific data to address cautionary jury instructions for eyewitness 
identifications.77 Based on nearly universal scientific consensus, these instructions explain the 
factors that research has shown may lead to a higher probability of misidentifications.78 In 1996, 
the court, in United States v. Burrous, offered a comprehensive and lengthy cautionary 
instruction on many of these factors.79 The beginning of this instruction summarized the dangers 
of misidentifications as follows: 
 
I want to caution you, first, that the kind of identification testimony you heard in this case 
must be scrutinized carefully. Scientific studies have amply demonstrated the dangers of 
mistake in human perception and identification. Of course, this does not mean that the 
identification in this case is incorrect. I merely tell you this so that you understand the 
importance of carefully evaluating the evidence here.80  
 
The court in Burrous then embarked on a cautionary instruction, which although not as 
organized as the eyewitness instructions generally seen today, still discussed the factors of 
misidentifications in length.81 While this opening paragraph in Burrous laconically outlines the 
issues surrounding eyewitness misidentifications, the court found it necessary to support this 
opening statement with a litany of specific evidence behind it.82 However, as discussed later in 
this article, one potential approach to jury instructions for police credibility would be to offer a 
similarly concise instruction in the form of a one-paragraph summary. While such an instruction 
would lack effectiveness, it would at least acknowledge the problem and leave room for reform 
down the road.  
 
Nonetheless, other potential avenues for structured, scientific, and extensive eyewitness jury 
instructions exist. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently found certain factors 
must be included in model cautionary jury instructions regarding eyewitness testimony. In 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Gomes, “the defendant slashed the face of the victim . . . 
with a box cutter while the victim was sitting in the driver's seat of his vehicle.”83 A nearby 
                                                 
76 Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony: Which 
Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal.  
77 United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 470 
Mass. 352 (2015) (holding modified by Com. v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873, 472 Mass. 16 (2015); State v. 
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) (holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 208 N.J. 
307 (2011))). 
78 Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 909-10 (Mass. 2015). 
79 United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 530-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 899 (Mass 2015). 
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convenience store clerk, the victim’s passenger, and the victim all later identified the 
defendant.84 At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction that would have included many of 
the scientific factors shown to increase the chances of a misidentification.85 However, the judge 
declined to do so.86  
 
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s ruling and affirmed two 
of the convictions.87 Nonetheless, the court decided to incorporate certain factors that have 
achieved “near consensus in the relevant scientific community” into model eyewitness 
identification instructions.88 Somewhat ironically, these factors appear to be substantially similar 
to the factors proposed by the defendant in his underlying case.89 The five factors listed by the 
court included the following: 
 
[1] Human memory does not function like a video recording but is a complex process that 
consists of three stages: acquisition, retention, and retrieval . . . [2] An eyewitness's 
expressed certainty in an identification, standing alone, may not indicate the accuracy of 
the identification, especially where the witness did not describe that level of certainty 
when the witness first made the identification . . . [3] High levels of stress can reduce an 
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification . . . [4] Information that is 
unrelated to the initial viewing of the event, which an eyewitness receives before or after 
making an identification, can influence the witness's later recollection of the memory or 
of the identification . . . [5] A prior viewing of a suspect at an identification procedure 
may reduce the reliability of a subsequent identification procedure in which the same 
suspect is shown.90 
 
The court then took these factors and created a model jury instruction.91 This instruction 
included approximately three pages of language that would be used in every case.92 Portions of 
the rest of the instructions were to be included only if evidence in the case made them relevant.93 
These portions delved more deeply into the original five factors listed by the court, and included 
evidence such as whether an individual’s face was obscured,94 a weapon was involved,95 the 
identification was cross-racial,96 there was a lineup97 or a witness viewed the defendant multiple 
                                                 
84 Id. at 901–02. 
85 Id. at 902–03. 
86 Id. at 904. 
87 Id. at 905.  
88 Id. at 909.  
89 Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 911-16 (Mass 2015). 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 918–27. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 920–27. 
94 Id. at 920.  
95 Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 920 (Mass 2015). 
96 Id. at 921. 
97 Id. at 924. 
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times.98 The court also made sure to note the potential need for revision of these model jury 
instructions in the future.99 While the jury instructions created in Gomes may seem thorough, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court actually relied on a prior case from New Jersey that went into 
even greater detail and has been seen as a turning point in eyewitness identification 
instructions.100  
 
In State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on thousands of pages of 
scientific research and data, recognized the effects of certain factors on misidentifications and the 
importance of revising jury instructions for eyewitness testimony.101 After discussing the need to 
balance the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the State’s interest in presenting important 
evidence, the court listed variables that lower courts should examine when dealing with 
eyewitness identifications.102 These variables were similar to those presented in Gomes but much 
more in-depth.103 Moreover, Henderson also included additional jury instructions that could be 
implicated based on the presence of certain evidence in the case.104  
Since Henderson, the effect of these detailed instructions on juries has been examined, and the 
results seem to show that, while jurors are impacted by such instructions, it’s not precisely how 
the New Jersey Supreme Court likely intended:105  
 
An initial evaluation suggests Henderson instructions may minimize the risk of wrongful 
convictions, but may not provide the educational function that results in sensitivity to the 
quality of eyewitness factors. That is, mock jurors were less likely to convict when given the 
Henderson instructions, regardless of whether the identification in question was secured 
using good or poor police practices.106 
 
Jurors were indeed convinced to scrutinize eyewitness identifications more closely, but did so 
uniformly, regardless of the specific facts and evidence of the case.107 It would therefore appear 
that Henderson might lean too far and instead bias jurors against all identifications. While one 
study is not dispositive and more research is needed on these issues, these results, if correct, 
                                                 
98 Id. at 926. 
99 Id. at 911. 
100 Id. at 910. 
101 Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and 
Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1331, 
1372 (2015) (citing State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) (holding modified by State v. 
Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 208 N.J. 307 (2011)).  
102 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) (holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 
A.3d 930, 208 N.J. 307 (2011)). 
103  See id.; Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 910 (Mass 2015) (noting the court in Henderson eventually 
led to the creation of a ten-page jury instruction for eyewitness identifications).  
104 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920-22 (2011).  
105 Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony: Which 
Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal (noting potential methodology problems with 
the study). 
106 Id. at 9.  
107 See id.  
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would be unacceptable for the courts. Fortunately, other possibilities exist to help make 
eyewitness instructions effective without broadly discrediting all identifications. 
 
3. Eyewitness Identifications: Effectiveness of Jury Instructions When Offered In Plain English 
 
One potential way to reduce the overbearing result of Henderson is to offer plain English 
instructions.108 Instead of inundating jurors with page after page of legalese and scientific jargon, 
giving jurors a comparatively brief and understandable overview of the issues may help lead to 
fairer outcomes.109 A sitting federal judge has offered the following example of plain English 
jury instructions:  
 
[y]ou may believe all of what any witness says, only part of it, or none of it. In evaluating 
a witness's testimony, consider the witness's: 
• Motives for testifying; 
• Interest in the outcome of the case; 
• Drug or alcohol use or addiction, if any; 
• The reasonableness of the witness's testimony.110 
 
Clear, simple, and straight-forward instructions like the excerpt offered above would likely do a 
better job of educating jurors without unintentionally and relentlessly indoctrinating them into 
believing eyewitness identifications (and police testimony) are always incorrect. Jurors already 
have a difficult time comprehending jury instructions.111 Giving juries the ability to grasp at least 
an overview of the issues seems preferable to the current system, where many times jurors 
cannot understand jury instructions and instead rely simply on a “gut feeling.”112  While the 
actual language of any jury instruction is important, another factor that may impact effectiveness 
is the introduction of an expert to support such instructions.  
 
4. Eyewitness Identifications: Effectiveness of Jury Instructions Accompanied by an Expert 
Witness’s Testimony 
 
Another potential way to more effectively walk the jury instruction tightrope would be to allow 
expert witnesses to testify and explain faulty identifications to the jury. Expert testimony is 
                                                 
108  Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and 
Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 
1331,1373 (2015) (citing See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011)). 
109 Id. at 1375. 
110 Id. at 1374. These instructions handle issues surrounding scientific research in a similarly modest 
manner. Scientific research has established that memory is not an exact recording of past events and 
witnesses may misremember events and conversations due to external stimuli that they may be exposed to 
such as statements, conversations, opinions, documents, reports, etc.  Even if a witness confidently 
testifies in good faith, his memory may be distorted at any stage: acquisition, storage and retrieval  
Such an approach would still adequately convey the issues surrounding eyewitness identification. Id. 
111 Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be 
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC 
L. REV. 865, 923–24 (2015). 
112 Id. 
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already generally viewed by the courts as a mechanism to aid jurors in their understanding and 
ultimate deliberations.113 Such an approach for eyewitness identifications (and implicit police 
credibility issues) would presumably help juries obtain a more thorough understanding of the 
science behind misidentifications, which would lead to more knowledgeable jurors coming to 
more just outcomes:114  
 
[S]tudies show that jurors tend to “accept [expert testimony] and incorporate it into their 
decision[-]making.” Research shows that jurors do not simply “suspend their own 
judgment in deference to the expert,” but rather they “evaluate [the expert's testimony] in 
light of [their] own experience, common sense, and recognition of the adversarial nature 
of the trial process.”115 
 
Expert testimony would be especially useful where jurors have preexisting, incorrect beliefs on 
certain subjects.116  For example, the common juror may hold misconceptions regarding the 
reliability and accuracy of a witness’s identification.117 Expert testimony could allay some of 
those misconceptions more effectively than jury instructions alone.118  
 
However, a large roadblock to obtaining an expert witness is the cost. Many criminal defendants 
are indigent and assigned public defenders, who in turn are already underfunded and 
overworked.119 State-level public defenders often lack the financial resources and time to hire 
every expert witness that would be helpful in a case.120 Hiring an expert merely to clarify the 
court’s jury instructions would likely be perceived as a much lower need for defendants.121 
Moreover, many state courts believe the absence of an expert to explain eyewitness 
misidentifications is usually not a due process violation.122 A potential reason for this view is 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be 
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC 
L. REV. 865, 923–24 (2015) (quoting Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: 
Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 140, 172 (1989)). 
116 See Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be 
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC 
L. REV. 865, 894 (2015). 
117 Id.  
118 Id. 
119 Oliver Laughland, The human toll of America’s public defender crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 
2016, 6:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/07/public-defender-us-criminal-justice-
system.  
120 See also id. 
121 Fortunately, some progress has been made on the federal level for this issue. The United States 
Supreme Court has found that an expert witness for an indigent defendant must provide a “significant 
factor” to the defense so that the expert’s absence would otherwise make a fair trial impossible. Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82–83 (1985). Partially because of this ruling, there is funding for federal expert 
witnesses available for to indigent defendants. National Research Council et al., Identifying the Culprit: 
Assessing Eyewitness Identification (2014), https://www.nap.edu/read/18891/chapter/5#39.  
122 National Research Council et al., Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification (2014), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/18891/chapter/5#39. 
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that state courts may believe experts in this situation tend to favor the defense more than the 
prosecution. These courts presumably want to avoid placing a thumb on the scales of justice for 
either side, and would therefore rather keep the defendant’s expert out of the courtroom on this 
issue.  
 
Similarly, allowing experts to explain misidentifications could lead to conflicting expert 
testimony, which has the potential to confuse the jury.123 Instead of clarifying the scientific 
factors behind identifications, the issue for jurors could simply become more muddled.124 Courts 
have discretion to determine whether the benefits of expert testimony outweigh the costs,125 and 
could very well decide to exclude both prosecution and defense experts on the grounds of 
keeping the issue relatively clear for juries, especially given the general reticence against experts 
in this area.126  
 
Despite the potential benefits that expert testimony can bring to aid a jury’s understanding of 
misidentifications, such an arrangement is likely unrealizable in the area of implicit bias towards 
police testimony.127 Scientific research on the implicit credibility of police testimony pales in 
comparison to the study of eyewitness misidentifications.128 Unlike with eyewitness testimony, 
jurors’ implicit favor towards police does not have the well of scientific data from which to spur 
change. While experts on this issue may currently be unobtainable, other avenues exist to 
increase the effectiveness of cautionary instructions on juries.  
 
5. Effectiveness of Jury Instructions Based on When They Are Given 
 
The timing of the jury instructions may also impact their effectiveness to jurors. As one study 
explained: 
 
For example, instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof, when given at the 
outset of the trial, increase jurors’ threshold for conviction and assist jurors in evaluating 
evidence in line with legal standards. Eyewitness instructions given prior to an 
eyewitness’ testimony may similarly assist jurors to evaluate such evidence.129  
 
While the cited study showed an increase in convictions, it also crucially showed an increased 
ability for jurors to evaluate the evidence.130 A juror who obtains the legal framework early can 
                                                 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See Virginia Hughes, Why Police Lineups Will Never Be Perfect, THE ATLANTIC, (Oct. 2, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/the-evolving-science-of-police-lineups/381046/ 
(noting it can take years before a scientific consensus emerges on a given topic, but especially when 
“injecting science into the justice system”).  
129 Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony: Which 
Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal. 
130 Id. 
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thereafter observe the case through the lens of the pertinent evidentiary standard. Otherwise, the 
juror must wait until the end of the trial to learn of the burden of proof, which is after the juror 
has likely formed a non-legal opinion on the disposition of the case. Such reasoning for the 
timing of jury instructions can be extended to instructions involving officer testimony. Jurors 
who are instructed on implicit credibility issues for police testimony before such testimony 
occurs would then likely be better equipped with the necessary knowledge to sufficiently inspect 
such testimony more so than someone who learns of this unconscious bias after the fact. 
 
Moreover, giving these instructions early will likely cause jurors to be “more alert and therefore 
receptive to the new information earlier in the trial.”131 Just as law students are generally less 
receptive to learning new material in the classroom on a Friday afternoon, so too is a jury less 
receptive to new information after several days (or even hours) of a trial. Therefore, giving these 
instructions early would likely find jurors more open to the idea that jury bias in favor of police 
exists, while also increasing the probability that these instructions would be remembered.  
 
6. Bringing Everything Together: How to Effectively Phrase and Implement Cautionary Jury 
Instructions Regarding Implicit Bias towards Police Officer Testimony 
 
After examining other areas of the law, a sufficiently effective solution can be crafted to address 
the issue of implicit police credibility. As discussed, the phrasing of cautionary jury instructions 
would need to straddle the line between having no impact and causing jurors to view all officers 
as inherently untrustworthy. In other words, these instructions would ideally dispel juries’ 
implicit (or explicit) biases in favor of police testimony, without going so far as to create biases 
against officer testimony. 
  
Part of the difficulty in completing this tightrope walk is the relative lack of research on the 
effectiveness of jury instructions. However, some of the research completed on this topic 
suggests a troubling outcome, as evidenced by the fact that the verbose and scientific approach 
taken by the court in Henderson appeared to decrease convictions across the board, regardless of 
the evidence.132 Therefore, this article offers three different types of potential cautionary jury 
instructions regarding jury bias in favor of police testimony (hereafter referred to as the “Brief 
Instructions,” “Pragmatic Instructions,” and “Lengthy Instructions”). While the Brief Instructions 
and Pragmatic Instructions offer a general, uniform template, the Lengthy Instructions would 
take an approach similar to Henderson and Gomes, in that additional instructions may be 
implicated based on the facts of the case. Moreover, some of these recommendations would be 
                                                 
131 The benefits of early exposure can be attributed to the primary effect seen when jurors tend to place 
great emphasis on ideas to which they are first exposed, i.e. first impressions are lasting impressions. 
Therefore, information presented during the earliest part of trial will be received, retained, and recalled 
better than other evidence. Attorneys use the concept of primacy when structuring the order of witnesses 
and exhibits by presenting high impact witnesses and exhibits first to make a stronger and more lasting 
impression. Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut 
Be Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 
QUINNIPAC L. REV. 865, 925 (2015). 
132 See Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony: 
Which Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal. 
20
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol11/iss2/5
21 
WARREN: HIDDEN IN PLAIN VIEW 
 
practical, straightforward, and ready to be applied, while others would require more research 
before being implemented. This article will set the guidelines for each of these solutions while 
also addressing potentially important issues surrounding their implementation.  
 
While all three versions of the jury instructions offer different challenges and benefits, they also 
share several common features, including being written in plain English, as opposed to highly-
technical legal jargon; the situations in which to give the instructions’ when during the trial the 
instructions are given; and the presence of an expert witness to help explain the reasoning behind 
the instructions. 
 
7. Common Traits Shared Among the Jury Instruction Recommendations 
 
First, any cautionary instructions on implicit police credibility should be used where an officer’s 
testimony is a substantial portion of the prosecution’s evidence, regardless of the level of 
offense. For the purposes of this article, “substantial” means that without such testimony, the 
State’s case would have to be dismissed. This standard would probably lead to cautionary 
instruction being given in cases involving misdemeanors and lower-level felonies, where police 
would likely be an eyewitness to the crime. While the stakes in such cases are relatively low, this 
area of the criminal justice system in particular would benefit from some level of reform, as the 
vast majority of the public’s interaction with the criminal justice system occurs here.133  
 
Second, these instructions should be given at the beginning of the judicial proceeding. Just as 
instructions on evidentiary standards have been shown to assist jurors in evaluating evidence, so 
too could instructions regarding implicit police credibility.134 Bringing awareness to this issue as 
soon as possible would help juries evaluate testimony with as little bias as possible. Jurors would 
learn about the issues surrounding implicit credibility before any testimony is heard, and would 
view such testimony through this lens without having to retroactively apply it. The early timing 
of these instructions would therefore equip juries with the knowledge to reliably evaluate 
testimony and lead to fairer outcomes. 
 
Third, to further increase the effectiveness of these cautionary jury instructions, the right to an 
expert witness should be created. An expert could then explain many of the issues outlined in 
this article regarding the implicit credibility given to police testimony by jurors. When dealing 
with eyewitness identifications, expert witnesses can bring credibility and understanding to 
issues of misidentifications for juries.135 Experts could bring similar benefits to the issue of 
police credibility. For example, experts have been shown to be particularly useful in dispelling 
incorrect, preconceived notions held by jurors.136 As previously discussed, the current 
demographic makeup of juries across the nation tends to implicitly favor the prosecution and 
                                                 
133 See also Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 267 (2011). 
134 Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be 
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC 
L. REV. 865, 925 (2015).  
135 Id. at 922–23.  
136 Id. at 924. 
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police testimony.137 Just as some jurors may hold misconceptions and need to be convinced 
misidentifications are a problem, so too may jurors need to hear more evidence supporting the 
issue of implicit officer trustworthiness.138 Therefore, similar to expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness misidentifications, experts could offer further support to aid in effectively dispelling 
implicit biases in favor of police testimony at trial. 
 
Lastly, any cautionary instructions should be written in plain English to increase a jury’s 
understanding. In general, the effectiveness of jury instructions is unacceptably low.139 A large 
part of this problem stems from a lack of comprehension.140 While lawyers and judges train for 
years to enter the courtroom arena, serving as a juror is often the first time a lay juror has 
witnessed a trial. Instead of using highly technical, legal phrases, courts should strive to make 
jury instructions as accessible and understandable as possible to all potential jurors. Therefore, in 
order to balance the complexities of the issues being conveyed with the ability for all jurors to 
understand those issues, all three types of the jury instructions recommended by this article will 
use plain English as much as possible. 
 
8. Recommendation One: The Brief Instructions 
 
The Brief Instructions would offer an undeviating, general template for addressing juror bias in 
favor of police testimony. The Brief Instruction would not be tailored to the particular facts of a 
case, but would instead uniformly apply where an officer’s testimony is a substantial part of the 
prosecution’s case.  
 
The Brief Instruction would likely have the highest chance of implementation because of the low 
level of effect it would have on juries. This instruction would hopefully bring some level of 
awareness to jurors without creating prejudice against all officer testimony. However, just as the 
courts’ current, fleeting instruction to treat police as any other witness likely does not alleviate 
issues of implicit bias, the Brief Instruction would likely also not go far enough in effectively 
addressing this issue. The Brief Instruction would be similar to the length and scope of the 
summary paragraph of the eyewitness identification instructions given in Burrous and Williams. 
It would read as follows:  
 
I want to instruct you, first, that the kind of police officer testimony you will hear in this case 
must be examined carefully. Scientific studies and judicial proceedings have shown the 
difficulties, stresses, and potential for abuses inherent to policing.  
At the same time, it is quite legitimate for defense counsel to examine the credibility of a 
police officer on the grounds that her perspective may not be neutral.  
Of course, this does not mean any of these issues are applicable in this case. Instead, I merely 
say this so you understand the importance of carefully evaluating the evidence here.  
                                                 
137 Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities 
and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 773, 793 (2013).  
138 Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be 
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC 
L. REV. 865, 925 (2015).   
139 Id. at 923–24.  
140 Id. 
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The Brief Instructions would likely not be as effective as other potential instructions, in part 
because of the entrenched, positive views of police held by many jurors and in part because of 
the brevity of the instructions. However, implementing these instructions would certainly be an 
improvement over the current situation, and would serve as both an acknowledgement of an 
issue within courtrooms across the United States, as well as a step towards remedying that 
problem. While any progress on this issue would be noteworthy, the next recommendation would 
do even more to increase the effectiveness of juries. 
 
9. Recommendation Two: The Pragmatic Instructions 
 
The second recommendation falls somewhere between the concision of the Brief Instructions and 
the wordiness of the Lengthy Instructions. Like the Brief Instructions, the Pragmatic Instructions 
would also contain an undeviating, general template for every case in which it is applied. 
However, this template would be longer than the in the Brief Instructions and implicate certain 
issues with more specificity.  
 
The phrasing of the Pragmatic Instructions would look more like the instructions offered in 
Gomes, which contained a relatively short, general template. However, unlike Gomes and 
Henderson, no additional instructions would be given based on the facts of a case. The general 
template would go farther than the Brief Instructions by getting more in-depth regarding the role 
of police in the judicial system. Specifically, language similar to (but not limited to) the 
following would be included: 
 
Carefully weighing the credibility of police officer testimony is one way to ensure the 
judicial system maintains its impartiality. Officers operate under higher levels of stress 
than the general public, work closely with prosecutors, regularly testify in the courtroom, 
and spend most of their time addressing crime and criminals. Due to this viewpoint, 
officers may not be a neutral observer like the ordinary witness. Of course, this does not 
mean any of those factors affect the officer’s credibility in this case. Instead, I merely tell 
you this so that you understand the importance of carefully evaluating the evidence here. 
 
This uniform script would more carefully straddle the thin line of simply dispelling implicit 
biases than the Brief Instructions, in part because of its specificity. In other words, because the 
Pragmatic Instructions would discuss the context of officers in the criminal system more 
thoroughly, these instructions would have to be cautiously crafted to avoid decreasing 
convictions across the board. Nonetheless, the Pragmatic Instructions, by illuminating the role of 
the officer in the judicial system, would be more effective than the Brief Instructions in 
dispelling issues of implicit bias in favor of police. However, these instructions would not stop 
simply with the role of police, but would also go into issues surrounding juries today.  
 
The Pragmatic Instructions would also inform juries of the problem presented by this article. 
These instructions would discuss perceptions of local police, which generally follow trends 
based on racial demographics.141 Such instructions would also include an explanation that people 
                                                 
141 Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the 
Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 540 (2008) (discussing white, black, and Hispanic views on police 
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who view police more favorably are often more willing to accept officers’ statements at face 
value and, as a result, are less likely to give such statements sufficient scrutiny.142 This portion of 
the Pragmatic Instructions would need to succinctly and successfully persuade jurors of the 
potential existence of implicit bias.  
 
While this article’s focus is on the implicit jury bias in favor of police testimony, its ultimate 
goal is a fairer criminal justice system. In that vein, another important segment that could be 
included in the Pragmatic Instructions might examine issues surrounding a defendant’s true 
“peers.”143 Here, these instructions would inform jurors as to the critical necessity of judging a 
defendant on her conduct, and of not allowing biases concerning race, economic status, and 
social background to affect the jury’s reasoning. This statement would be followed by a short 
recitation of scientific research, which shows the dangers these implicit biases can wreak when a 
defendant appears differently than jurors.144 This way, juries would be better aware of the 
heightened potential for unfair outcomes when these two issues are combined, and would 
perhaps more closely scrutinize officer testimony and more fairly judge a defendant as a result. 
The Pragmatic Instructions would outline these concerns in manageable chunks for the jury to 
digest. 
 
These instructions would likely be more effective than the Brief Instructions primarily because 
of the greater specificity of the research backing up its content. The Pragmatic Instructions 
would go a long way towards addressing the issue of jury bias in favor of police testimony, and 
are this article’s foremost recommendation.  
 
Also worth addressing, however, is an approach more closely akin to the Henderson court: the 
Lengthy Instructions. The Lengthy Instructions, as its name implies, addresses the same issues 
brought up in the Pragmatic Instructions, only much more comprehensibly.   
Recommendation Three: The Lengthy Instructions 
The Lengthy Instructions are the longest and most detailed rendition of the three 
recommendations outlined in this article. Similar to the Pragmatic Instructions, the Lengthy 
Instructions would contain a general template applicable to every case where an officer’s 
testimony is a substantial portion of the State’s case. However, this template would go into even 
greater specificity than the Pragmatic Instructions.  
 
For one, these instructions would definitively include the main problem presented with this 
article and the scientific research supporting it. This portion of the Lengthy Instructions would 
delve deeper into these issues than the potential discussions offered in the Pragmatic Instructions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
satisfaction by demographic); Rich Morin et al., The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016 /09/29/the-racial-
confidence-gap-in-police-performance/.  
142Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities 
and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 773, 793 (2013).  
143 Christine T. Cline et al., Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual Consequences, 
AMERICAN BAR (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversity-
inclusion/news_analysis/articles_2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-
consequences.html.  
144 Id. 
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For example, issues involving implicit police bias with white, upper-middle class jurors would 
be presented in a step-by-step fashion, similar to the progression of this article’s Section I. 
Moreover, a similar, logical progression would address issues surrounding race and one’s 
“peers.”145  
 
Second, instead of simply mentioning the high stress conditions in which officers operate, the 
Lengthy Instructions would go into greater detail as to what those conditions are and how they 
can affect decision-making and judgment.146 Moreover, these instructions would examine the 
effects of such conditions, including the higher prevalence of negative health conditions 
experienced by officers and the implications associated with them.147 These instructions would 
also necessarily emphasize the fact that good-faith errors may occur under such difficult 
conditions. 
 
Third, the Lengthy Instructions would also thoroughly discuss the relationship between police 
officers, prosecutors, and the police’s frequent dealings with suspects of a crime.148 To this end, 
the fact that officers are “expert” fact witnesses would also be examined.149 Similarly, the 
Lengthy Instructions would discuss the potential police misconduct and the corresponding lack 
of punishment.150 However, the police misconduct portion of the Lengthy Instructions would be 
                                                 
145 Id. 
146 Erika Hayasaki, Life of a Police Officer: Medically and Psychologically Ruinous, THE ATLANTIC 
(March 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/life-of-a-police-officer-medically-
and-psychologically-ruinous/284324/ (citing C. Chung et al., Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder 
and exposure to traumatic stressors are related to brain structural volumes and behavioral measures of 
affective stimulus processing in police officers, PUBMED (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pubmed/23177923); Charles R. Marmar, et al., Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress in Police and Other 
First Responders, 1071 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 18 (2006), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstre 
am/handle/2027.42/ 74485/annals.1364.00?sequence=1. 
147 Erika Hayasaki, Life of a Police Officer: Medically and Psychologically Ruinous, THE ATLANTIC 
(March 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/life-of-a-police-officer-medically-
and-psychologically-ruinous/284324/ (citing C. Chung et al., Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder 
and exposure to traumatic stressors are related to brain structural volumes and behavioral measures of 
affective stimulus processing in police officers, PUBMED (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pubmed/23177923); Charles R. Marmar, et al., Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress in Police and Other 
First Responders, 1071 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 18 (2006), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstre 
am/handle/2027.42/ 74485/annals.1364.00?sequence=1.  
148 Howard Friedman, To Protect and Serve, TRIAL, Dec. 7, 2011, at 14, 16 (citing David Harris, The 
Interaction and Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How this Affects 
Police Reform Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna and 
Marianne Wade eds., 2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this 
relationship impacts police misconduct). 
149 Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1322 (1994) (“The problem is that some officers 
have learned to describe investigations that conform to constitutional requirements regardless of the 
reality of the investigation.”). 
150 Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins-Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias 
and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 712–16 (2015) (examining certain implicit 
biases which create a broad variance in the way racial groups are treated at various phases in the criminal 
system); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, 
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relatively brief compared to the rest of the instructions. Part of the reasoning behind this decision 
would be to focus more on illuminating the potential implicit bias when viewing police 
credibility, as opposed to creating the perception of attacking police officer credibility in general. 
 
Topics generally regarded as an increase in credibility could, in this way, be cast in a different 
light. For example, traditionally, a twenty-year veteran would appear as experienced and 
proficient, which would in turn lead to a boost in credibility. However, when accompanied by the 
relevant jury instructions detailing the potential health and personal effects of long-term policing, 
jurors could also see an officer who has an altered perspective based on his dealings with 
criminals, the prosecution, and the justice system over the course of two decades. Although 
potential issues involving the credibility of a specific officer would likely be exposed at trial, 
such instructions would help jurors reach fairer outcomes.  
 
Another provocative idea would be to examine the composition of the jury and background of 
the defendant in each case to determine whether additional instructions are necessary. Primarily, 
this scenario would occur when an all-white jury faces a minority defendant. As discussed, the 
conviction rates of an all-white jury and black defendant drop significantly when at least one 
black individual is present on the jury.151 It would therefore make sense to attempt to alleviate 
this conviction gap with alternative measures, such as additional instructions, when a jury is 
composed solely of white members. If these instructions were included in this section, then 
discussion of this issue in the general template of the Lengthy Instructions could likely be 
shaved, with a full discussion given only when relevant. 
 
The idea behind the Lengthy Instructions is to fully draw back the curtain and allow juries to see 
the entire picture. While the Brief Instructions and the Pragmatic Instructions primarily concern 
themselves with examining the role, difficulties, and potential for partiality associated with 
policing, the Lengthy Instructions would go a step further. These instructions would thoroughly 
scrutinize the police while at the same time informing jurors that they themselves may not be so 
impartial. Many jurors would likely need a substantial regiment of persuasion and evidence 
before believing they may hold certain implicit biases, and the Lengthy Instructions would be in 
a better position to deliver exactly that.  
 
A potential drawback from the implementation of the Lengthy Instructions is the possibility of 
painting all officers as inherently untrustworthy, thereby creating biases against police testimony. 
Just as listing the scientifically verified factors in Henderson over a prolonged period of time 
may have made jurors more doubtful on the usefulness of eyewitness identifications in any 
situation, so too may the Lengthy Instructions carry a jury too far. After hearing so many 
                                                                                                                                                             
Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); see German Lopez, American policing is 
broken. Here’s how to fix it, VOX (May 2, 2017, 9:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2016/11/29/12989428/police-shooting-race-crime (examining comprehensive police misconduct). 
151 Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16% More Often than Whites, 
(April 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy; see also German Lopez, Study: cities rely 
more on fines for revenue if they have more black residents, VOX (July 7, 2017, 8:01 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/7/7/15929196/police-fines-study-racism (noting that traffic citations 
of minority citizens fell more than fifty percent, in towns seeking additional sources of revenue, with the 
election of one black individual to city council).  
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potentially negative issues surrounding police, as well as attempting to alter the perspective a 
juror may have previously held about herself, it would not defy logic to conclude juries would 
likely exonerate defendants across the board, regardless of the strength of the evidence, when 
such officer testimony and instructions are involved.  
 
Of the three, the Pragmatic Instructions likely represent the best attempt to walk the tightrope 
between being unheeded by juries and portraying all police as inherently untrustworthy. The 
Pragmatic Instructions would outline several ostensibly radical ideas and give jurors enough 
evidence to potentially convince them of the existence of implicit bias. For reasons likely 
guessed, the Brief Instructions are probably too brief to make a significant impact, and the 
Lengthy Instructions would go much too far for large swaths of the public. However, no progress 
on this issue can be made if these issues are simply ignored. Unfortunately, the implementation 
of any of these proposed instructions would likely fall flat in courtrooms across the nation.  
 
10. Will Courts Actually Give These New Instructions? 
 
Regrettably, courts would likely be unwilling to give any cautionary jury instructions regarding 
police testimony for a litany of reasons. For one, courts have historically almost uniformly 
refused to offer cautionary jury instructions regarding officer testimony.152 Other than the 
recently visible groundswell of activity from certain portions of the public, no momentous 
transformation has occurred to spur courts to change.153 Compounding this glacial movement is 
the lack of research on this topic. The dearth of evidence on jury bias towards officers makes it 
difficult not only to implement an effective instruction, but also to convince courts a problem 
even exists. Courts would likely be hesitant to change decades, if not centuries, of precedent 
without an abundance of evidence to support it, especially when it concerns the “guardians of 
society.”154  
 
Moreover, even with the necessary research, it may take decades to effectuate change. One only 
needs to look at the length of time it has taken the judicial system to recognize certain issues 
surrounding eyewitness identification –– issues that have been known by the scientific 
community for quite some time –– to see an example of this.155 Coupled with this lack of 
research, courts would continue to worry about unfairly prejudicing one side over the other in a 
criminal trial.  
 
C. Recommendation Two: Use Certain Voir Dire Questions To Remove Authoritarian Jurors 
                                                 
152 Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer 
Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 250 (2017). 
153 Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins-Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias 
and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 712–16 (2015) (examining certain implicit 
biases which create a broad variance in the way racial groups are treated at various phases in the criminal 
system). 
154 Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  
155 See Virginia Hughes, Why Police Lineups Will Never Be Perfect, THE ATLANTIC, (Oct. 2, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/the-evolving-science-of-police-lineups/381046 / 
(noting it can take years before a scientific consensus emerges on a given topic, but especially when 
“injecting science into the justice system”). 
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Jury instructions can only be effective if jurors are willing to listen. Accordingly, the second 
recommendation of this article suggests making courtroom verdicts fairer by selecting better-
suited jurors, especially in cases where police testimony is a substantial portion of the 
prosecution’s case. Specifically, attorneys should seek to identify and remove jurors who exhibit 
authoritarian tendencies from the jury pool.156 These “authoritarian jurors” are not ideal 
candidates for juries.157  
 
Authoritarian jurors are more likely to accept police officer testimony at face value than average 
jurors, and also more likely to find a defendant guilty.158 This is true even when the evidence is 
decidedly in favor of the defendant:159 
 
[A] study of authoritarianism in the legal setting concluded that persons prone to convict, 
even when the evidence was deliberately slanted toward innocence, scored higher in 
authoritarianism than persons who acquitted, confirming previous studies showing that 
high authoritarians tend to be punitive. Authoritarian jurors are more likely to convict in 
criminal trials and are more severe in their punishments.160  
 
As a consequence, each additional authoritarian juror on a jury tends to increase both convictions 
and the length of prison sentences,161 and a jury composed entirely of authoritarian jurors 
generally recommends sentences twice as long as juries without authoritarians present. 162  
 
These types of jurors are detrimental to the criminal justice system. For one, the criminal system 
strives towards consistency when it comes to sentencing.163 Unfortunately, authoritarian jurors 
                                                 
156 This attempt to seek out authoritarian jurors should not be limited solely to defense attorneys. 
Prosecutors have just as much an interest in securing the fair outcome of a case, in part because of the 
harmful effects a wrongful conviction can play for the prosecutor personally, the defendant, and the 
justice system in general. Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral 
Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-
consequences.aspx.  
157 See Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of Authoritarianism as an Indicator of 
Juror Bias, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-me-to-
your-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. Narby, 
Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and jurors' 
perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)). 
158 Id. 
159 Authoritarian jurors give higher probabilities to the likelihood a defendant is guilty. Id.  
160 Id.  
161 Dennis J. Devine et. al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating 
Groups, 7 PSYCHOLOGY PUB. POL’Y & L.  622, 633 (2001). 
162 Id. 
163 The need to strive for consistency is due to possible implicit biases that impact sentencing towards 
various groups, such as different racial groups. Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court 
Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 374–
75 (2010). 
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unjustifiably skew both sentencing and convictions upwards.164 In other words, whether a 
defendant is convicted may turn solely on how many authoritarian jurors are present. 
Furthermore, authoritarians increase the chance for variance among defendants convicted for 
substantially similar acts.165 Moreover, as previously discussed, any conviction carries with it a 
host of collateral consequences.166 Those consequences should not be increased simply because 
an authoritarian juror is present. The unfairness and unwarranted harshness created by 
authoritarian jurors is yet another way the credibility of the courts is strained,167 and such actors 
should be urgently removed from the courtroom. The best (and generally only) opportunity to 
identify these jurors is during voir dire, and both prosecutors and defense attorneys should 
carefully consider which questions to ask to weed out authoritarian jurors.  
 
1. Composition of Voir Dire Inquiries 
 
Studies have been completed on effectively identifying individuals who exhibit strong 
characteristics of authoritarianism.168 Some of these questions appear on the nose, especially 
when read or asked one after the other. Therefore, attorneys should carefully consider which 
questions to ask, when to ask them, and how to ask them. Several such inquiries, which can be 
used to elicit a yes or no response from a juror, are as follows: 
 
- Too many obviously guilty persons escape punishment because of legal technicalities.   
- The law coddles criminals to the detriment of society.  
- Upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police. 
- The freedom of society is endangered at least as much by overzealous law enforcement as 
by the acts of individual criminals. 
- It is better for society that several guilty men be freed than that one innocent man be 
wrongfully imprisoned. 
- Citizens need to be protected against excess police power as well as against criminals. 
                                                 
164 See Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of Authoritarianism as an Indicator of 
Juror Bias, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-me-to-
your-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. Narby, 
Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and jurors' 
perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)). 
165 See Dennis J. Devine et. al, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating 
Groups, 7 PSYCHOLOGY PUB. POL’Y & L.  622 (2001). 
166 Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. 
OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-consequences.aspx.   
167 See Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of 
Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413, 415 (1997); Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack vs. Coke 
Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV.COM (Feb. 22, 2015, 12:14 PM), 
http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (citing Joseph J. Palamar et al., 
Powder cocaine and crack use in the United States: An examination of risk for arrest and socioeconomic 
disparities in use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015)). 
168 See Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of Authoritarianism as an Indicator of 
Juror Bias, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-me-to-
your-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. Narby, 
Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and jurors' 
perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)). 
29
Warren: Hidden in Plain View
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2018
30 
WARREN: HIDDEN IN PLAIN VIEW 
 
- It is justifiable to suspend a person’s civil rights in the interests of national security.  
- Defendants in a criminal case should be required to take the witness stand.169 
 
The above questions should aid both prosecutors and defense lawyers in identifying authoritarian 
jurors.170 However, while these questions may be effective, such inquiries are only useful if 
attorneys decide to use them. Authoritarian jurors have been known to the legal system for many 
years, and nearly all of these questions came from studies that occurred in the last century. 
Attorneys should understand the enormous problems authoritarian jurors pose for the justice 
system, especially after examining the issues surrounding implicit credibility of police officers.  
 
Authoritarians are impacting a justice system where the majority of juries already implicitly 
favor the prosecution and police testimony, while simultaneously implicitly disfavoring a 
defendant who has the misfortune of simply being different than those in the jury box.171 
Authoritarian jurors should have no place in an already imperfect system of justice. All attorneys 
in a criminal proceeding should therefore use the above inquiries to identify and remove 
malignant authoritarians before their intolerable ideals of justice can infect other jurors. 
 
D. Recommendation Three: Disallow Officers to Testify in Uniform and Sit at the Prosecution’s 
Table in Court 
 
Finally, the simple and seemingly practical procedures of officers in the courtroom should be 
briefly examined. Specifically, police should not be allowed to testify in uniform. Officers in 
uniform have been shown to impact nearby observers in a variety of ways.172 Such impacts 
include feeling safer around a uniformed officer;173 an increased perception of “competence, 
                                                 
169 See id.; see Mark Bennett, Small Step Toward Scientific Jury Selection, BENNETT & BENNETT 
BLOG (June 22, 2010), http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2010/06/small-step-toward-scientific-jury-
selection/.  
170 Attorneys may also consider that prospective jurors may give false answers due to fear of public scorn 
or otherwise. Additional questions exist to identify authoritarian jurors, but the wording of these questions 
create at least some doubt in the author’s mind that a juror’s answers would always be truthful (e.g.  
“[h]ow would you feel if a family member wanted to marry someone who is [African-American, Muslim, 
an exotic dancer, etc.]?”; and “[h]ave you ever been invited to the home of someone who is [homosexual, 
Hispanic, Jehovah’s Witness, etc.]?”). See Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of 
Authoritarianism as an Indicator of Juror Bias, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 1, 2009), 
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-me-to-your-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-
an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. Narby, Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the 
association between authoritarianism and jurors' perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J APPLIED 
PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)). These questions should therefore likely be avoided in favor of other 
effective and less controversial questions.  
171 See Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, & Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities 
and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 Law & Soc. Inquiry 773, 793 (2013); Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: 
Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 
245, 256 (2017). 
172 Ciro Civile & Sukhvinder S. Obhi, Students Wearing Police Uniforms Exhibit Biased Attention toward 
Individuals Wearing Hoodies, FRONT. PSYCHOL. (Feb. 6, 2017), http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10. 
3389/fpsyg.2017.00062/full.  
173 Id.  
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reliability, intelligence, helpfulness, status, and authority” of the person in uniform;174 an 
increased perceived level of attractiveness of an officer;175 and other links between the uniform 
and “concepts of power and social control.”176 All of these influences serve to increase the 
implicit credibility of police officers and should therefore be left out of the courtroom during an 
officer’s testimony.  
 
Furthermore, while there is no prohibition against it, other witnesses generally do not wear 
clothing specifically associated with their professions on the stand. In the author’s experience, 
firefighters usually do not testify in a flame-retardant outfit, astronauts do not testify in a NASA 
jumpsuit, and doctors do not testify in a white coat, with a stethoscope at the ready around their 
necks. When viewed through this light, it becomes even more curious as to why officers testify 
in uniform. If the criminal justice system truly believes instructing officers to be treated as any 
other witness is an effective approach to the problems discussed in this article, then police should 
at least be required to dress like one. 
 
In a similar vein, police should not be permitted to sit with the prosecution at their trial table. 
Normal witnesses are not generally seen sitting with the prosecution, even when called by the 
State.177 Such an act further diminishes the courts’ instruction to treat officers merely as any 
other witness. Therefore, either police should be required to act accordingly, or the courts’ 
instruction regarding police credibility need to change. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The recommendations set forth in this article would help make outcomes fairer in court. While 
police officers are an integral part of society and play a vital role in civilization,178 so too does 
the perception of the criminal justice system by the public. Officers cannot continue to be both 
“the guardians of society” and merely any other witness in the eyes of the court. The criminal 
justice system should strive to illuminate the issues of implicit credibility in relation to police 
testimony instead of refusing to address them. While all of the recommendations in this article 
should be examined, cautionary jury instructions, in particular, would be an effective way to 
address a fundamental problem that has quietly plagued the judiciary for decades. 
 
The Pragmatic Instructions likely present the best way to walk the line between being ineffective 
on juries and creating universal untrustworthiness toward officers. Such instructions would 
effectively convey the issues discussed in this article and efficiently provide supporting evidence 
outlining these problems. Moreover, the Lengthy Instructions could be examined after more 
                                                 
174 Id.  
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 United States v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding no impropriety when an FBI 
agent sat at the prosecution’s table during the trial); United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 162 (2d Cir. 
2016) (finding that an investigative officer in a criminal case can be exempted from witness sequestration 
and can remain in the courtroom even when other witnesses are required to leave). Such acts indisputably 
treat officers differently than any other witnesses called to testify.  
178 See also Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME & POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL & CIVIL (1651).  
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research has occurred on the problems discussed in this article. Until such study occurs, even 
something as diminutive as the Brief Instructions would be a step in the right direction. Although 
such a short instruction would likely be relatively ineffective in convincing jurors a problem 
exists, at the very least the judiciary would be recognizing an issue in courtrooms across the 
United States. Such a change would hopefully crack the door for real change in the future. 
 
Despite the breadth of recommendations discussed in the article, a true fix to this issue is likely 
not possible. Potential for abuses will always be present, humans will continue to be imperfect, 
and true justice will remain elusive. However, although far from perfect, these recommendations 
would make a measurable difference in the impartiality of the criminal justice system today. The 
goal of the criminal system should not be to endeavor for perfection, but instead to always strive 
towards greater fairness, equality, and objectivity. Such an opportunity presents itself with the 
recommendations of this article. While the evolution of the judicial system sometimes feels 
excruciatingly slow, it is my hope the issues discussed in this article will be efficiently and 
effectively addressed, and one day supplemented by better solutions for ensuring fairness in our 
continuing pursuit of justice for all.  
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